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Answer the questions with a minimum of 300 words. Must use provided material (PDF book), along with ONE other additional sources to answer questions. Please use in-text citations at the beginning of each new paragraph to support your facts. Reference/cite in APA format: Hall, D. (2015). Criminal law and procedure (7th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. 1.) Do you believe that deception (i.e, lying, etc.) is a valid and justifiable interrogation technique? Are there evidentiary and /or ethical ramifications by using such a technique? Explain your arguments.

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Chapter 13: Interrogation, Electronic Surveillance, and Other Police Practices   471
confessions, and admissions to prove guilt is controversial. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that admissions are highly suspect when relied upon alone to
obtain a confession. The Court stated, in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964),4 that a “system
of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on
extrinsic evidence independently” obtained through other law enforcement practices.
At common law, confessions and admissions could be used freely, as long as they
were made voluntarily. The early basis for excluding involuntary confessions was the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 Eventually, federal
­defendants could seek to have confessions suppressed if they were not taken before a magistrate promptly after arrest. This was known as L
the McNabb-Mallory rule, named for
two Supreme Court cases. The rule was not constitutionally based. Instead, the Court
­announced the rule in its supervisory role over theI nation’s federal courts. While the rule
of quick presentment of arrestees to judges had D
existed at common law and had been
codified by Congress, there was no remedy for violations. Accordingly, the Court held
D should be excluded. Congress rethat confessions that occurred after unreasonable delays
E a statute that permits the admission
acted to McNabb-Mallory and Miranda by enacting
of a confession so long as it was voluntarily given. Another
section provides that regardless
of any delay in presenting a suspect to a judge, a confession shall be admitted if obtained
within 6 hours of arrest. In Corley v. United States,L556 U.S.—(2009) it was held that if
there is a delay in presenting a suspect to a judge ,longer than 6 hours, the old McNabbMallory exclusionary rule applies if a delay is found to be unreasonable.
Today, interrogations, confessions, and admissions are governed by these rules, as
well as two broader rights: the Fifth AmendmentTright to be free from self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.I
F Court case Miranda v. Arizona,
By virtue of popular television and films, the Supreme
or at least the “Miranda” warnings that are a product
A of that case, is one of the best
known judicial decisions of our time.
5384 U.S. 436 (1966)
[The Supreme Court consolidated appeals from
interrogated at a police station. He was not advised
several individuals who had been convicted at trials
of his constitutional rights, he never ­requested to
where their confessions were entered into evidence.
see an attorney, and he never refused to discuss the
Ernesto Miranda, for whom the case is named,
allegations with the officers. He only had contact
was arrested for rape and kidnapping. He was
with the police during the interrogation. After two
9781305686120, Criminal Law and Procedure, Seventh Edition, Hall – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization.
472   Part II Criminal Procedure
(c o nti nu e d)
hours he signed a written confession to the rape. He
also attested to the voluntariness of his confession
in the document. He was convicted, appealed, and
lost in Arizona’s appellate courts. Chief Justice Earl
Warren delivered the Court’s opinion.]
The cases before us raise questions that go
to the roots of our concepts of American criminal
jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe
consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we Ideal
with the admissibility of statements obtained from
an individual who is subjected to custodial police inD
terrogation and the necessity for procedures which
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not
to be compelled to incriminate himself. . . .
Our holding will be spelled out with some
specificity in the pages which follow but briefly
stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeI
guards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation,Fwe
mean questioning initiated by law-enforcement ofF
ficers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action inA
significant way. As for the procedural safeguards
to be employed, unless other fully effective means
are devised to inform accused persons of their right
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following measures are required.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that5any
statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed.8The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowS
ingly, and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may
not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
The constitutional issue we decide in each
of these cases is the admissibility of statements
obtained from a defendant questioned while in
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives,
or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he
was cut off from the outside world. In none of these
cases was the defendant given a full and effective
warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all of the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them,
signed statements as well, which were admitted at
their trials. They all thus share salient features—
incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights.
An understanding of the nature and setting of
this in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact
that in this country they have largely taken place
incommunicado. From extensive factual studies
undertaken in the early 1930s . . . it is clear that police violence and the “third degree” flourished at
that time. In a series of cases decided by the Court
long after those studies, the police resulted to physical brutality—beating, hanging, whipping—and to
9781305686120, Criminal Law and Procedure, Seventh Edition, Hall – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization.
Chapter 13: Interrogation, Electronic Surveillance, and Other Police Practices   473
(c o nti nu e d)
sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort confessions. . . .
Again we stress that the modern practice of
in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather
than physically oriented. As we have stated before,
“. . . this court has recognized that coercion can be
mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstituL
tional inquisition.”. . .
The circumstances surrounding in-custody
I interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear
the will of one merely made aware of his privilege
[against self-incrimination] by his interrogators.
Therefore, the right to have counsel presentEat the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege under the L
we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that
L the
individual’s right to choose between silence and
speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered
by those who will conduct the interrogation,
T cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most
require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning
given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient
F to
accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim
that the admonishment of the right to remain silent
A and
without more “will benefit only the recidivist
the professional.” Even preliminary adviceNgiven
to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly
Y …
overcome by the secret interrogation process.
Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a
right to consult with counsel prior to questioning,
but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
The presence of counsel at the interrogation
may serve several significant subsidiary functions
as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the
dangers of trustworthiness. With a lawyer present
the likelihood that the police will practice coercion
is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised
the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a
lawyer can also help to guarantee that the ­accused
gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that
the statement is rightly reported to the prosecution.
[Miranda’s case was remanded, he was retried,
his confession was excluded, and he was again convicted. Although sentenced to twenty to thirty years
in prison, he was paroled in 1972. Subsequently, he
found himself in trouble on several occasions, one
leading to revocation of his parole. He spent another year in prison, was released, and was stabbed
to death in bar room fight in 1976. Several Miranda
Warning Cards, which he had been autographing
and selling, were found on his person at the time of
his death. The man alleged to have killed Miranda
was arrested, read his Miranda rights, invoked his
right to remain silent, was released, and fled. The
Miranda murder was never prosecuted.]
Although Miranda concerns the rights of suspects
to counsel in certain circumstances, it is not a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
The right of a suspect to
counsel at this early stage in the process rests upon the Fifth Amendment’s right to
T Court found that to meaningfully
be free from self-incrimination. Simply stated, the
implement the right to be free from self-incrimination,
suspects must be informed
of both their right to remain silent and to the assistance of legal counsel before they
are questioned.
9781305686120, Criminal Law and Procedure, Seventh Edition, Hall – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization.
474   Part II Criminal Procedure
The Warnings
The heart of the Miranda decision is the warnings. These are
1. The right to remain silent.
2. Any statements made may be used against the defendant to gain a conviction.
3. The right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during
4. For the indigent, a lawyer will be provided without cost.
The warnings are to be read to all persons in custody who are to be interrogated.­
The law does not presume that any person, including an attorney, knows these
rights. The warnings should be presented in a timely manner and read at such a speed
I a full understanding of their import.
that the arrestee can gain
Specific languageD
need not be used, as long as the defendant is fully and effectively
apprised of each right. For example, the Court approved the following language against
the defendant’s claimDthat it conveyed the idea that he had a right to speak to his
­attorney before questioning
E but not during questioning.
“You have the rightLto talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and “[y]
ou have the right toLuse any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”
The words, the ,Court found, “were not the clearest possible formulation of
Miranda’s right-to-counsel advisement, they were sufficiently comprehensive and
comprehensible when given a commonsense reading.”7
T agencies have made it a policy to record (video/audio or
Many law enforcement
audio only) the givingI of the warnings and any waiver of rights to eliminate any question concerning whether the warnings were given and whether coercion was used to
gain a waiver.
Not all questioning by law enforcement officers must be preceded by the Miranda
N must be “in custody” and “interrogated” by police before
warnings. A defendant
Miranda has effect. This
Y is known as the “custodial interrogation” requirement.
Custodial Interrogation
The Court used the phrase “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way” to define the custody element of Miranda. An objective
test is used to determine
1 if a suspect is in custody, the suspect’s and interrogating officer’s subjective beliefs about the status of the suspect are not dispositive.8 This includes
the officer’s opinions about whether the suspect committed the crime and whether the
6 The test to determine if a person is in custody for Miranda is
individual is in custody.
objective—whether a 8
reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Although a statement by a police officer to a suspect that he is not under arrest is not dispositive, it may
T a person is in custody if an officer a­ nnounces that an arrest
be considered. Of course,
is being made or that S
the person is not free to leave. The Court made it clear that the
in-custody element may be satisfied anywhere. The defendant need not be at the police
station to be in custody.
9781305686120, Criminal Law and Procedure, Seventh Edition, Hall – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization.
Chapter 13: Interrogation, Electronic Surveillance, and Other Police Practices   475
Typically a brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer is not a custodial situation. All of the surrounding facts must be considered in making the custody
determination. The location of the interrogation is very important. There is a greater
chance of finding a person in custody if the questioning took place in a police station
or prosecutor’s office rather than the suspect’s home or in public. The presence of other
persons during the interrogation decreases the odds of the suspect being in custody.
The Court found the fact that the suspects in Miranda were “cut off from the outside
world” troubling. The length and intensity of the questioning are also relevant.
The Supreme Court found age to be a factor in a case where police interrogated
a 13-year-old boy enrolled in special education classes outside the presence of his
guardians and without Mirandizing him. The Court
L concluded that the child’s age
and maturity impacted his perception of whether he was free to leave, as well as his
ability to develop sound judgement.9
Determining whether a prisoner is in custody
D for purposes of Miranda is somewhat confounding. This was the issue in the Howes case.
v. Fields
L565 U.S. ___ (2012)
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
■   ■   ■
While serving a sentence in a Michigan jail, Randall
Fields was escorted by a corrections officer to a
conference room where two sheriff’s deputies quesFcame
tioned him about allegations that, before he
to prison, he had engaged in sexual conduct
F with
a 12-year-old boy. In order to get to the conference
A pass
room, Fields had to go down one floor and
through a locked door that separated two sections
of the facility. Fields arrived at the conference room
between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. and was questioned for
between five and seven hours.
At the beginning of the interview, Fields
1 was
told that he was free to leave and return to his
5 leave
cell. Later, he was again told that he could
whenever he wanted. The two interviewing6deputies were armed during the interview, but Fields re8
mained free of handcuffs and other restraints. The
T open
door to the conference room was sometimes
and sometimes shut.
About halfway through the interview, after
Fields had been confronted with the allegations of
abuse, he became agitated and began to yell. Fields
testified that one of the deputies, using an expletive, told him to sit down and said that “if [he] didn’t
want to cooperate, [he] could leave.” Fields eventually confessed to engaging in sex acts with the boy.
According to Fields’ testimony at a suppression
hearing, he said several times during the interview
that he no longer wanted to talk to the deputies, but
he did not ask to go back to his cell prior to the end
of the interview.
When he was eventually ready to leave, he had
to wait an additional 20 minutes or so because a corrections officer had to be summoned to escort him
back to his cell, and he did not return to his cell until
well after the hour when he generally retired. At no
time was Fields given Miranda warnings or advised
that he did not have to speak with the deputies.
The State of Michigan charged Fields with
criminal sexual conduct. Relying on Miranda, Fields
9781305686120, Criminal Law and Procedure, Seventh Edition, Hall – © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. No distribution allowed without express authorization.
476   Part II Criminal Procedure
Howes v. Fields
(c o nti nu e d)
moved to suppress his confession, but the trial
court denied his motion. [He was convicted and
sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison.]
As used in our Miranda case law, “custody”
is a term of art that specifies circumstances that
are thought generally to present a serious danger
of coercion. In determining whether a person is in
custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain
L of
whether, in light of “the objective circumstances
the interrogation,” a “reasonable person [would]
have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave. And in order to determine how a suspect would have “gauge[d]”Dhis
“freedom of movement,” courts must examineE
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Relevant factors include the location ofLthe
questioning, its duration, statements made during
the interview, the presence or absence of physical
restraints during the questioning, and the release
of the interviewee at the end of the questioning. . . .
Determining whether an individual’s freedom
of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the
first step in the analysis, not the last. Not all restraints
on freedom of movement amount to custodyFfor
purposes of Miranda. We have “decline[d] to accord
talismanic power” to the freedom-of-movement inA
quiry, and have instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment presentsNthe
same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda. “Our
cases make clear . . . that the ­freedom-of-movement
test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for Miranda custody.”
There are at least three strong grounds for5
conclusion that prisoners will not feel in custody].
First, questioning a person who is already serving
a prison term does not generally involve the shock
that very often accompanies arrest. In the paradigT
mati …
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